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Jamie Jordan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (China) has
enforced a population control scheme, commonly referred to as the One-
Child Policy (OCP). These policies were enacted to curb China's rapid
population growth. This scheme promotes marriage at a late age, strict
family planning, and most notably, one child per couple.' The official
position of the central government is that the policies should be enforced
with economic and social incentives. 2 To achieve its mission, the central
government delegates the responsibility of meeting population control
goals to the local authorities and imposes harsh penalties on those who fail
to meet them. Therefore, the local government officials have resorted to
forcing abortions and sterilization.4 These officials have also been accused
of using sterilization and abortions as punishment for those who speak
against the policies or refuse to comply, even if they have not violated the
policies by having more than one child.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., International Studies, magna cum laude, 2003, American University. I would like to
thank Bruno Marcos for his help with this Note and his patience for the last three years.
1. See Marriage Law (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 10, 1980,
effective Jan. 1, 1981) LEXIS PRCLEG 11 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Marriage Law]; Law on
Population and Family Planning (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002) LEXIS PRCLEG 2209 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Population Law].
2. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2005), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20050824/index.htm
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
3. Forced Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Hearing
Before the-Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the Comm. on nt 'l Relations
H.R., 105th Cong. 16 (1998) (testimony of Gao Xiao Duan, Fmr. Administer, Planned Birth
Control Office, P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1998 Hearing].
4. Id.
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Following the enactment of the OCP, Chinese citizens began fleeing
China seeking protection from the policies. Many of those fleeing went to
the United States and tried to claim asylum under the immigration laws at
the time. However, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 5
continually rejected these claims. The INS rejected the applications based
on a failure to meet the nexus requirement of the asylum statute. In Chang,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected the argument that a
resistance to China's OCP itself could constitute persecution on account of
one of the five factors listed in the statute.6
However, even after the decision in Chang, these asylum applicants did
not disappear and the U.S. government began to learn more about China's
population control policies. The government became increasingly
concerned and felt that it had to change its policy towards these asylum
applications. After several attempts, Congress finally addressed this
problem by amending the definition of "refugee" in the asylum statute in
1996. 7 With the enactment of section 601 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), those who fled a
coercive population control policy could meet the nexus requirement by
establishing persecution based on political opinion.8 Despite amending the
definition of refugee, Congress limited the annual number of asylum grants
based on such persecution to 1,000 grants.9
As asylum officers and immigration judges began granting asylum
under the IIRIRA amendment, it became clear that the number of credible
asylum seekers surpassed the 1,000 grants available. As a result, the INS
began issuing conditional grants of asylum to all credible asylum
applications based on persecution stemming from coercive population
control policies (CPC).' 0 For these applicants, this practice led to a seven-
year wait before receiving full asylum and all of its benefits. Further, after
the seven-year wait for asylum status, these applicants would have to wait
5. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is currently known as the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service.
6. Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 38 (BIA 1989), superseded by statute, Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
601, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
7. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42))
[hereinafter IIRIRA].
8. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1990), amended by
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3689.
9. IIRIRA, supra note 7, at 3009-689.
10. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1998), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1998/1998yb.pdf [hereinafter 1998 YEARBOOK].
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approximately sixteen more years before receiving legal permanent
resident status (LPR).1
In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act and removed the limits on
both the number of asylum applications that can be granted based on CPC
and the number of asylees that are allowed to adjust their status to LPR
each year. 12 While removing these caps will relieve the backlog that
currently exists in the asylum process, other provisions of the REAL ID
Act may make it much harder for asylum applicants to prove claims of
persecution based on the CPC.
This Note will review the progress of section 601 of the IIRIRA since
its enactment ten years ago. It will also show that by removing the
numerical limits on asylum grants for CPC with the REAL ID Act,
Congress remains dedicated to providing asylum for those who are fleeing
China's OCP, but that the other provisions of the REAL ID Act may have
unintended negative consequences for the same applicants that Congress
sought to protect. Part II will give an overview of the OCP in China,
including an explanation of the law, the reasons for its implementation, and
an assessment of the effects of this policy. Part III will offer a background
of asylum law and explain how the IIRIRA changed the law on asylum,
including judicial interpretations of the amendment and the problems that
the numerical limit has caused in implementation. The last part will
explain the current process of applying for asylum based on coercive
population control in light of the most recent changes in the REAL ID Act
of 2005. This part will demonstrate that the REAL ID Act's removal of the
caps was a step in the right direction, but that it may lead to new problems
caused by other provisions of the Act that increase the burden on the
applicant.
II. CHINA'S COERCIVE POPULATION CONTROL POLICY
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
Historically, the Communist leadership in China encouraged
population growth. From the late 1940s through the early 1970s, Mao
Zedong encouraged families to have more children based on the theory that
every person could produce more than he could consume. 13  The
Communists also believed that a large population would hasten
11. RUTH WASEM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 18 (Cong.
Research Serv., Library of Congress ed. 2005).
12. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 304-5.
13. Anne M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecution: Their Effect
on Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing the Forced Sterilization and Abortion
Policies of the People's Republic of China, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 621, 623
(1996).
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modernization.' 4 On an individual basis, the preference was also to have
many children. China lacked an established pension or social security
system for the retired, so having many children would ensure a couple's
financial stability by ensuring that their children would be able to provide
for them later in life.' 5 Also, in rural areas, children made up an important
part of the labor force.
16
By the late 1970s, the central government realized that population
growth was out of control.' 7 The Chinese government was faced with the
problem of having to provide food, housing, employment, and medical care
for its huge population.' 8 To deal with these problems, the government
decided to implement a series of family planning policies, including
promoting late marriage, birth control, and one child per couple.
B. THE ONE-CHILD POLICY AS WRITTEN
China's CPC policies are articulated in many different sources of
Chinese legislation. The foundation and purpose of these policies can be
found in article 25 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(Constitution) which states that "[t]he state promotes family planning so
that population growth may fit the plans for economic and social
development."' 9
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and Family
Planning (Population Law) is currently the most important legislation with
regards to China's coercive population control policies. 20 The Population
Law promulgates that it is the "basic national policy of China to apply
family planning" to improve the quality of life in China. 21 The government
relies on publicity, education, science, and health care advancements to
carry out population control and family planning. The central
government delegates the implementation of the policies set forth in this
law to various levels of local government 23 and commands public
organizations, including labor unions and the Communist Youth League, to
help the local government enforce these laws.2 4 The law requires the media
to promote family planning and the schools to educate students about sex
14. Kimberly Sicard, Note, Section 601 of I1RIRA: A Long Road to a Resolution of
United States Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 928 (2000).
15. Sicard, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. XIAN FA art. 25 (2004) (P.R.C,).
20. See Population Law, supra note 1.
21. Id. at art. 2.
22. Id.
23. Id. at ch. 1.
24. Id. at art. 7.
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and family planning.25  By involving local government, public
organizations, the media, and schools, the central government is able to
ensure that the family planning guidelines are followed. Even more
importantly, the involvement of these local organizations make coercion
possible since friends and neighbors are required to encourage family
planning and to report those who do not follow the laws.
In addition, the Population Law sets forth the basic family planning
rules that citizens must follow. 26 It stresses that citizens should marry at a
late age and one wife may bear only one child.27 To ensure that each wife
has only one child, all spouses of child-bearing age must use contraception,
which the government provides for free.28 However, to prevent gender-
based abortions, the law also prohibits gender selection and mistreatment of
female babies, including the use of ultrasounds to determine the gender of a
fetus or the abortion of a fetus based on its gender.29
The law sets out a series of social and economic incentives for those
who follow the rules and punishments for those who do not.30  The
incentives for practicing family planning, according to the government
guidelines, include extended maternity leave with job security, preference
in government welfare programs, and compensated sick leave for
sterilizations and abortions.31 The punishments for those who have more
than one child include payment of "social upbringing charges" which
include late fees, administrative and disciplinary punishments by the
government, criticism, and education from the family planning
departments.32 The law also provides for administrative punishments and
criticism of those who refuse to assist in the implementation of the family
planning laws.33 Through the coercive use of criticism, threats, and
punishment against the local governing bodies, the central government
ensures complete compliance with family planning polices throughout
China.
The Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China (Marriage Law)
also plays a part in the country's population control.34 Article 5 of the
Marriage Law declares "[n]o marriage may be contracted before the man
has reached 22 years of age and the woman 20 years of age. Late marriage
and late childbirth shall be encouraged., 35 This article is important to
25. Id. at art. 13.
26. Population Law, supra note 1, at art. 3.
27. Id. at art. 18.
28. Id. at arts. 19-20.
29. Id. at arts. 22, 35.
30. Id. at ch. 4-6.
31. Id. at ch. 4.
32. Id. at ch. 6.
33. Id.
34. See Marriage Law, supra note 1.
35. Id. at art. 5.
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China's family planning policies because the government hopes that by
forcing late marriage and late childbirth a couple will have less of an
opportunity to have multiple children. Article 12 of the Marriage Law goes
on to say that "[b]oth husband and wife shall have the duty to practise
family planning. 36
C. THE ONE-CHILD POLICY IN REALITY
As seen above, the laws that set forth China's population control
policies seem almost reasonable considering China's population problems.
However, as applied, these laws have proven to be very dangerous to
Chinese society. To implement these laws, local government officials are
given quotas that specify how many children can be born in the region.37
Local officials face high fines and punishment should they fail to meet the
quotas.38 As a result, the local officials have gone beyond ethical
boundaries to reach these quotas.
As a precautionary measure to avoid surpassing the quota allotted by
the central government, the local government monitors all women in the
area who are of childbearing age. 39 The government rewards citizens who
inform on their neighbors for violating these law, including having extra
children and not taking contraception.40 Women are required to use
contraception immediately after giving birth to their first child.41 If a
woman becomes pregnant with more than one child, the local officials will
force her to undergo an abortion; regardless of how far along the mother is
in her pregnancy.42 Late-term abortions are performed regularly and are
referred to as "induced delivery" because they are performed any time
before birth.43 It has also been reported that couples who do not follow the
regional family planning procedures are forcibly sterilized.44  Often,
relatives of those who have gone into hiding to avoid an abortion or
sterilization will be targeted in an effort to coerce the couple to reveal
themselves.45 Furthermore, since adopting children is treated the same as
giving birth, couples are unwilling to adopt because they will not be
36. Marriage Law, supra note 1, at art. 12.
37. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 17.
38. Gomez, supra note 13, at 624.
39. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 17.
40. Id. at 29.
41. See Population Law, supra note 1.
42. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 17.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 18.
45. China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy Enforcement
Before the Comm. on Int'l Relations H.R., 108th Cong. 108-58 (2004) (statement of T.
Kumar, Advocacy Director for Asia & Pacific, Amnesty International USA) [hereinafter
2004 Hearing].
allowed to have a child of their own.46 The government does not allow
adoption in addition to the one biological child, because it fears that people
will have unauthorized children who their relatives will legally adopt.
D. THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
In addition to the immediate harm that is done to the victims of China's
coercive population control policies, there are also many long-term
negative side-effects. One of the most pervasive side-effects is the gender
disparity that now exists in China. The Chinese have traditionally
preferred male children, anticipating that they will carry on the family
name, support their parents in old age, and assist with chores around the
house. Consequently, the one-child policy has resulted in millions of
missing girls. Female babies are often abandoned or aborted so the parents
will not be deprived of a son. In 2000, the census reported that there were
19 million more boys aged 0-15 than girls.4 7 The central government has
tried to address this problem by prohibiting ultrasounds to determine the
sex of the baby and gender-selective abortions, but it has had little
success. 48 In addition, approximately 500 women commit suicide every
day in China.4 9
These population control policies have negatively affected the children
born under their enactment. China does not have an effective social
security program, so these children have the sole burden of supporting their
parents in retirement.50 Another pervasive problem is the lack of female
partners for male children because of the lack of females born since the
implementation of the policies. 51 If male children manage to find a spouse,
they face another obstacle in China's rising divorce rate. The divorce rates
have risen drastically in China recently, especially among those who were
born during the government's implementation of the one-child policy. This
increase has been attributed partly to the financial strains that couples face
from having to support two sets of parents.52
Faced with the horrors of China's coercive population control policies
and the impact that it has had on Chinese society, many people began
fleeing. Of those who fled, many ended up in the U.S. hoping to receive a
grant of asylum based on the persecution that they faced or would face in
China. However, for a long time the U.S. was unable to properly deal with
this new breed of persecution and was unsure of whether it even fit into the
established regulatory scheme for granting asylum.
46. Id. at 38-39 (statement of Harry Wu, Executive Director, Laogai Research
Foundation).
47. 2004 Hearing, supra note 45, at 5 (statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith).
48. Id. at 21 (statement of Hon. Arthur E. Dewey).
49. Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith).
50. Id. at 21 (statement of Hon. Arthur E. Dewey).
51. Id. at 5 (statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith).
52. Jean Chua, Shanghai Split, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 14, 2006.
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III. UNITED STATES LAW ON ASYLUM
A. ASYLUM LAW BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF IIRIRA
In 1968, the U.S. joined the 1967 United Nations Protocol on
Refugees, which "prohibits a State party from expelling or returning a
refugee from a country where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of protected characteristics in the refugee
definition., 53 Under this protocol:
[A] refugee is defined as any person who "owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country...."
To comply with this protocol, Congress passed the Refugee Act of
1980. 55 The Refugee Act implemented the definition of refugee set forth in
the U.N. Protocol, but also added a provision that allows a person who was
persecuted in the past to qualify for refugee status.56 The U.S. definition of
a refugee appears in Section 101 (a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and states the following:
The term "refugee" means... any person who is outside any
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
A person applying for asylum under the U.S. definition of refugee58 has
the burden of proving persecution by showing that they have either been
persecuted in the past, or have a well-founded fear of future persecution.
53. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, History of the United
States Asylum Corps (History), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1 a/?vgnextoid=62c26138f898d010VgnVCM 10000048f3
d6al RCRD&vgnextchannel=828807b03d92b01OVgnVCM10000045f3d6al RCRD (last
visited April 10, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS History].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (1990).
58. Refugees are aliens whose cases are considered before entering the U.S., while
asylees are those whose cases are considered while the alien is present in the U.S. The same
requirements of proving status as a refugee applies to both refugees and asylees. WASEM,
supra note 11, at n. 1.
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The applicant must further show a nexus between the persecution, or fear
of persecution, and race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. In regards to the persecution
requirement, an applicant can prove either past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution. An applicant has a well-founded fear if:
(1) the applicant is afraid of persecution in his or her country of nationality
on account of one of the five elements; (2) there is a reasonable possibility
of suffering such persecution if he or she returned to that country; and (3)
he or she is unable or unwilling to return to or avail him or herself of the
protection of that country based on that fear.59
Though the INA does not define persecution, the court in Mogharrabi
established a set of requirements for the courts to consider when
determining whether the applicant suffered persecution.60 These guidelines
state that to demonstrate persecution four elements must be met: (1) the
applicant must possess a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the
persecutor must have been aware, or have the potential to become aware,
that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor must
have the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor must have
the inclination to punish the alien. 6' Even if the applicant meets this
burden, the INA makes it clear that the Attorney General has the discretion
to exclude certain aliens from eligibility for asylum.62 Aliens who are not
eligible for asylum include those who participated in persecution in the
63past, were convicted of a serious crime, or are a danger to society.
It was under this scheme that Chinese applicants began seeking asylum
in the U.S. based on China's OCP. Asylum officers and Immigration
Judges were initially very inconsistent when considering these
applications,64 but the BIA's decision in Chang in 1989 attempted to put an
end to the numerous inconsistencies with regards to applications based on
China's OCP.
65
59. WASEM, supra note 11, at 7; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987).
60. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
61. Charles E. Schulman, Note, The Grant of Asylum to Chinese Citizens Who
Oppose China's One-Child Policy: A Policy of Persecution or Population Control?, 16 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 313, 328 (1996).
62. WASEM, supra note 11, at 1.
63. Id.
64. Schulman, supra note 61, at 320.
65. See Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989), superseded by statute,
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
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1. Attempts to Seek Asylum in the U.S. Before IIRIRA - Chang
In Chang, the respondent, Chang, was a native of China who applied
for asylum as a defense to deportation.66 He claimed that he was opposed
to the OCP 6 7 and that because he and his wife had two children in China,
the government had attempted to forcibly sterilize both of them to prevent
them from having more children.68 He claimed that his wife was able to
postpone the surgery because she was sick, but that if he did not escape
from China, he would be sterilized.69 In his asylum application, Chang
claimed that he had a well-founded fear of persecution because it was
likely that he would be forcibly sterilized if he returned to China due to his
membership in a social group made up of those who oppose the OCP.
70
After reviewing the evidence offered by the respondent and general
reports about the OCP, the court rejected Chang's application for asylum.
The court determined that the implementation of the OCP by the Chinese
government was not "on its face persecutive" and did not create a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five reasons
enumerated in the INA statute, even to the extent that forced sterilization
may occur. 7 1 The court rejected Chang's argument that he was persecuted
as part of a social group on the grounds that the OCP applies to all of
China's citizens. The court stated that "an asylum claim based solely on
the fact that the applicant is subject to this policy must fail ' 72 because it has
not been shown that the persecution was based on anything but general
population control, which does not meet the nexus requirement in the
statute.73
The court went on to explain what an asylum applicant must
demonstrate for his application to be granted. It stated that an individual
claiming asylum for reasons related to the one-child policy must establish
that the policy was selectively, or more severely applied, based on one of
the five elements listed in the INA.74 It stressed that those who oppose the
OCP could not be considered a social group under the statute, unless the
policy was applied more harshly to that group.75 The applicant was also
required to show that if the alleged persecution was caused by local
officials, that there was no redress available from higher levels of
government.76 Without such a showing, the applicant could not meet the
66. Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 39.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 43-44.
72. Id. at 44.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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burden of proving that he satisfied the definition of asylum. This case
made it nearly impossible for a Chinese alien to claim asylum based on
opposition to the OCP.
2. The Aftermath of Chang
The BIA's decision in Chang was heavily criticized.77 Congress
immediately tried to overrule it with the Armstrong-DeConcini
Amendment to the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989,
which would have forced the INS to grant asylum to Chinese applicants
seeking it based on coercive population control.78 While the Act passed in
both the House and the Senate, President Bush vetoed it, despite his
support for the Amendment.79 Instead, the President chose to issue an
Executive Order to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to give
greater consideration to those who claimed persecution based on a state's
policy to force abortions and sterilization. 80 Despite this, the INS published
its 1990 asylum regulations without the interim rule that would have
overruled Chang.81 Thus, the BIA and the courts believed that the interim
rule never became law and continued to follow Chang as controlling
precedent. 82 When the Clinton administration took office, it took the same
position as the courts and declared that Chang was still good law.83
The early 1990s brought a new wave of inconsistent judicial rulings
regarding asylum based on persecution from China's coercive population
control policies. The federal courts continued to disagree as to whether
Chang was controlling, given Bush's Executive Order which attempted to
overrule it.84 Then, in 1994, President Clinton changed his position and
declared that the U.S. should offer temporary shelter, short of asylum, to
those who might be harmed in China due to the OCP. In 1996, Congress
finally managed to address these inconsistencies by enacting section 601 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.
85
77. See generally Schulman, supra note 61; Gomez, supra note 13; Sicard, supra note 14.
78. Gomez, supra note 13, at 637.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Sicard, supra note 14, at 934.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Guo v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Guo v.
Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995) (The district court held that it is only bound to
precedent when it is consistent and since it is not in this area, the court does not have to
follow Chang. It allowed the applicant to receive asylum based on persecution on account
of political opinion. The court of appeals reversed, claiming Chang was still good law.).
See also Chen v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995).
85. Sicard, supra note 14, at 934-36.
Summer 2007]
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
B. SECTION 601 OF THE IIRIRA
On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the IIRIRA,
including section 601, which effectively overruled the BIA's long-disputed
ruling in Chang. Section 601(a)(1) expanded the definition of political
opinion (within the refugee definition) to include resistance to coercive
population control policies.86 The amended definition, as it appears in
section 101 (a)(42) of the INA, reads:
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a
well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or
resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.
87
Section 601 went on to impose a limit of 1,000 on the number of
applicants who could be admitted as refugees or granted asylum under this
new definition of political opinion.88 This limit was imposed to assuage
fears that the amendment would lead to a huge influx of Chinese asylum-
seekers.
Section 601 clearly overruled Chang and finally made it possible for
Chinese applicants to receive asylum based on China's OCP. However,
there was early criticism that the amendment was gender-biased because it
would be easier for a female to claim asylum under the amended definition
based on a forced abortion than it would be for the father of an aborted
baby to claim asylum. In addition, heavy criticism was focused on the cap
on asylum grants based on coercive population control policies. Critics
believed that the cap discriminated against a small group of asylum
applicants, which was contrary to the purpose of U.S. asylum law. 89 As
demonstrated below, these criticisms were justified. However, both the
courts and Congress have slowly begun to address these concerns in the
past ten years.
86. IIRIRA, supra note 7, at § 601(a)(1).
87. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1990), amended by
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 689.
88. IIRIRA, supra note 7.
89. WASEM, supra note 11, at 20.
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C. POST-IIRIRA DEVELOPMENTS
1. BIA's Decision to Correct the Wrongs of the Past Using Section 601
Section 601 was not only available to new applicants for asylum, but
also those whose applications had been denied based on Chang. In the
BIA's decision in In re X-G-W, the court decided that it would "consider
motions to reopen to apply for asylum based on coerced population control
policies pursuant to the Board's authority 'to reopen or reconsider on its
own motion in any case in which we have rendered a decision."' 90 The
court stated that it had the power to reopen cases "where it would serve the
interests of justice."9' The court determined that it was in the interest of
justice to allow reopening of any asylum applications based on coercive
population control where (1) the applicant had previously presented
persuasive evidence of persecution based on the OCP; and (2) where the
asylum application was denied based on its decision in Chang.92 Board
member Michael J. Heilman wrote a dissent in this case claiming that the
BIA did not have the power to reopen these cases.93 He argued that the
general exception the court relied upon (that it could reopen cases when it
is in the interests of justice) was outweighed by the fact that Congress had
not seen fit to give section 601 retroactive effect.
94
Though this dissent shows that the majority's opinion may have been a
stretch of the law, it seems that the court felt an obligation to correct the
mistake that it had made in Chang. The court in Chang underestimated the
effect of China's OCP and misunderstood the reality of the program when
it held that the OCP on its face was not persecutive. At the time of this
decision, new evidence was coming to the attention of the U.S. about
China's implementation of the OCP and it was becoming clear that forced
abortions and sterilizations were much more widespread than the U.S. had
imagined and that the central government was more culpable than
originally thought.95 Thus, the BIA felt it necessary to reopen these cases
to remedy those mistakes.
Subsequent decisions refined the parameters of reopening these cases.
In Zhang v. Gonzales, the court stated that when an immigration judge is
presiding over a reopened case, that judge cannot reject the prior judge's
90. In re X-G-W, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 71 (BIA 1998).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 73.
93. Id. at 77 (Heilman, M., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. The House Committee on International Relations held a hearing just ten days
before this decision to gather more evidence regarding China's OCP from witnesses who
had fled China. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3.
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determination that the witness was credible. 96 In 2002, the court decided In
re G-C-L in which it stated that the liberal reopening policies for untimely
claims would end in 90 days. The court came to the decision reasoning that
five years offered sufficient time for those with final orders of deportation
to seek relief under In re X-G- W.
9 7
2. Eliminating the Possibility of Gender Bias in Section 601
The courts also addressed and attempted to eliminate the possibility
that section 601 would offer less protection to men than women. In the
case In re C- Y-Z, the BIA decided that a spouse of a person who was forced
to abort a pregnancy or to be sterilized could also establish past persecution
and is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution
to qualify for asylum under section 601. 9  The court stated that "the
husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a
bona fide and non-frivolous application for asylum based on problems
impacting her more intimately than him."99
The court expanded on this principle in two more recent cases. In
Zhang, the court stated that "the act of forced sterilization is not a discrete
act, but rather a permanent and continuous form of persecution that
deprives the couple of the child or children who might have eventually
been born to them."' 00 In Ma v. Ashcroft, the court further extended this
protection to those whose marriages were not recognized by the Chinese
government.' 0 ' The court stated that where a traditional marriage
ceremony has taken place, but is not recognized by the government because
of age restrictions in the coercive population control policies, the applicant
should still be regarded as a spouse for purposes of U.S. asylum law.
10 2
These judicial decisions are the courts' laudable attempt to ensure that men
and women are afforded equal protection under the amended asylum
statute, despite the ambiguity in the statute itself.
D. COMPLICATIONS CREATED BY THE NUMERICAL LIMITS ON ASYLUM
GRANTS BASED ON COERCIVE POPULATION CONTROL
The most troubling aspect of section 601 of IIRIRA is the numerical
limit of 1,000 asylum grants per annum based on coercive population
96. Zhang v. Gonzalez, 434 F.3d 993, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Patricia
Manson, 7th Circuit Rules Against US. in Chinese Man's Asylum Case, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 20, 2006, at 3.
97. In re G-C-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359, 362 (BIA 2002).
98. In re C-Y-Z, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (BIA 1997).
99. Id. at 918.
100. Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1004.
101. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F. 3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004).
102. See id.; but c.f Chen v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 1859807 (3d Cir. 2004) (where the
court decided that the fianc6 of a woman who was forced to abort their child could not claim
the protection of section 601 because the court had to put some limits on the application of
section 601 due to the huge backlog in the system).
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control. Every year since 1998, the second year that asylum based on
coercive population control was available, the number of people granted
asylum has exceeded the 1,000 limit.10 3 China has been the only country of
origin for these asylum claims. 10 4 In 1998, China was ranked third for the
number of new asylum cases presented to the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) with 3,075 new claims'0 5 (this number
increased to 4,209 new cases in 1999). 106 There was an even greater
increase in new cases in 2000 when they reached 5,745.107 Though these
numbers include all asylum applications presented to the USCIS, not just
those which claimed persecution based on coercive population control, they
demonstrate that section 601 encouraged many new asylum applications in
the years following its enactment, and made China the number one source
country for asylum applications.1
0 8
As a result of the numerical limit placed on the grant of these asylum
applications, the immigration officials were faced with the problem of what
to do if more than 1,000 applicants presented worthy claims. Beginning in
1997, the year that the cap went into effect, immigration judges were
advised that they could not grant full asylum to any applicant who based
his claim on coercive population control policies. 10 9 Instead, they were
ordered to give conditional grants of asylum to all applicants who would
otherwise be eligible for asylum." 10 At the beginning of a new fiscal year,
the USCIS would issue 1,000 final grants of asylum to be counted towards
the annual limit for the previous year to those who have received
conditional grants in the previous years."' The USCIS chooses who will
receive the final grant based on the date of their conditional grant." 12
The problem with this system of conditional grants of asylum is that
the USCIS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review together have
granted more than 1,000 conditional grants each year, reaching a peak of
103. WASEM, supra note 11, at 16.
104. Id. at 17.
105. 1998 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at 89. This number only includes cases
presented to the USCIS within the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of
Justice's Office of Executive Office of Immigration Review also evaluates asylum
application. Id.
106. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1999), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf
107. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (2000), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2000/RA2000.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Sicard, supra note 14, at 937.
110. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS, 2003 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK 68 (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy03syb.pdf (last visited April
10, 2007) [hereinafter 2003 YEARBOOK].
111. Id.
112. Id.
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approximately 2,700 conditional grants in 1999.3 By 2003, the waiting
list to receive an adjustment from conditional to full asylum was
approximately 7,665 applicants." 4 So, a person granted conditional asylum
in 2003 would have to wait at least seven years before receiving full
asylum.
Receiving a conditional grant of asylum does not provide the applicant
with all of the benefits of true asylum. Those who receive conditional
asylum cannot apply for LPR in the U.S.; they have to wait until they have
had full asylum for one year. 115 This was aggravated by the fact that there
was also a numerical limit on the number of asylees who could adjust their
status to LPR each year, which is set at 10,000 people. 16 This numerical
limit is different from the numerical limit placed on the number of
applicants who can receive asylum because LPR's limit is based on 10,000
people, while the asylum limit is based on applications which can include
the applicant's spouse, children, and other family members. 17 At the end
of 2003 there were 158,624 cases pending for asylees to adjust their status
to LPR, which means that there is a sixteen year adjusting period.1 18 With
these two waiting periods combined, someone who received conditional
asylum in 2003 would wait approximately twenty-three years to receive
LPR.
There are also two other significant limitations on a conditional grant
of asylum. One limitation is that if someone with conditional status wants
to travel outside of the U.S., he or she will have to get permission to reenter
before leaving." 9 If this process is not followed, then the conditional
asylee will be presumed to have abandoned his or her asylum claim. 20 The
other limitation is that the applicant will not be able to obtain admission to
the U.S. for any family member who was not included in the original
application.121
The numerical limits placed on section 601 grant of asylum for
coercive population control and the resulting system of granting conditional
asylum have minimized the benefit of the rest of section 601. The purpose
of changing the definition of refugee was to ensure that those who sought
asylum based on persecution from China's OCP would receive it.
However, the cap on the number of grants has resulted in a huge backlog of
applicants who must wait in veritable limbo for a spot to open in order for
them to receive full asylum. There is no doubt that receiving a conditional
113. WASEM, supra note 11, at 17.
114. Id.
115. USCIS History, supra note 53.
116. WASEM, supra note 11, at 17.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 18.
119. USCIS History, supra note 53.
120. Id.
121. Chen, supra note 102, at 5.
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grant of asylum is much better than being deported, which was the fate of
those applicants before the enactment of section 601. Yet, this system still
does not comport with the purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980, which was
intended to offer equal treatment to all applicants for asylum.1 22 These
specific applicants receive the main benefit of asylum - they are not
repatriated to a country that would persecute them, but they are deprived of
any certainty and stability for the future.
Since the number of conditional grants of asylum peaked in 1999, the
number has slowly, but steadily, declined. 123 In addition, China had the
largest decline in new asylum cases in 2003 (even though it remained the
number one source country for asylum applicants). 124  Though this
downward trend may have been caused by many other factors, it is likely
that it is partly the result of the growing backlog in the conditional grant
system.
IV. ASYLUM BASED ON RESISTANCE TO COERCIVE
POPULATION CONTROL: TODAY AND TOMORROW
A. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005
As a result of the 108th Congress's work on the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,125 the 109th Congress took up the
task of reviewing immigration and document-security issues in 2005. The
result of this review was the REAL ID Act of 2005, which was signed into
law on May 11, 2005.126 Section 101 of the REAL ID Act made several
changes to asylum law. The majority of these changes were heavily
criticized by immigrants' rights groups who claimed that the REAL ID Act
would make it much harder for an asylum applicant to meet his burden and
receive asylum. However, there were two small changes to the law that
were praised by these groups: the removal of the numerical limits for both
granting asylum to those who resisted coercive population control and for
adjustment of status.
122. WASEM, supra note 11, at 3.
123. Id. at 7.
124. 2003 YEARBOOK, supra note 110, at 46.
125. Sicard, supra note 14, at 933.
126. See MICHAEL J. GARCIA ET AL., IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR
PROVISIONS OF THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 1 (Cong. Research Serv., Library of Congress ed.
2005).
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1. Removal of the Numerical Limits for Asylees Resisting Coercive
Population Control and Seeking Adjustment of Status
Often referred to as the only triumph for asylum-seekers in the REAL
ID Act are sections 101(g)(1) and 101(g)(2), which removed these caps.127
Section 101(g)(1) removed the cap on the number of asylees who can
receive an adjustment of status to LPR. 128 Section 101(g)(2) removed the
cap on the number of refugee and asylum-seekers who can receive
resettlement and asylum for resisting coercive population control
policies. 129 Pursuant to these changes, asylum officials have been issuing
final asylum approvals to new cases based on CPC and to applicants who
already have conditional grants, 30 clearing the backlog of asylum-seekers
who have been waiting for a full grant of asylum.' 3' Further, since the cap
was removed for the adjustment of status, those who receive a final grant of
asylum can look forward to receiving an adjustment of status after only one
year as an asylee.
132
2. Other Relevant Changes to Asylum Law in the REAL ID Act Which
Could Increase the Difficulty of Receiving Asylum Based on CPC
Section 101 of the REAL ID Act made other significant changes to
asylum law. These changes have drawn the most criticism. First, the Act
codified the existing case law which states that the burden of proof is on
the asylum-seeker to establish that he or she meets the refugee definition
specified in the INA. 133 In addition, if the immigration judge determines
that more corroborating evidence is necessary to deternine that the claim is
credible, then the applicant must provide that evidence. 134 Previously, the
adverse credibility finding could be based in part, but not solely, on an
applicant's failure to provide this information. 35 This provision could
cause problems for Chinese applicants resisting CPC because the central
government has continually denied that forced abortions and sterilizations
occur in China. 136  This denial means that proper records will not be
forthcoming in an effort to keep the practice a secret.
127. Human Rights First, REAL ID Endangers People Fleeing Persecution,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum 10-sensenbr.asp (last visited Mar. 5,
2006).
128. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(g)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 304-5.
129. Id. at § 101(g)(2).
130. USCIS History, supra note 53.
131. Id.
132. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylee or Refugee Seeking Lawful
Permanent Resident (LPR) Status, http://149.101.23.2/graphics/services/refadjust/index.htm
(last visited April 10, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS LPR].
133. WASEM, supra note 11, at 23.
134. Id.
135. GARCIA, supra note 126, at 4.
136. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2.
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The Act makes it possible for the judge to consider factors including:
[D]emeanor, candor, responsiveness, inherent plausibility of the
account, consistency between the written and oral statements...
internal consistency of a statement, consistency of statements with
other evidence of record... and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency...
goes to the heart of the applicant's claim.' 
37
Prior case law indicated that the judge could not consider
inconsistencies that were not related to the heart of the claim. 38 This
change will have an impact on applications based on CPC because it will
make it easier for the judge to make an adverse credibility determination
when considering an application. Many times, Chinese applicants give
inconsistent statements regarding what happened to them while in China
due to fear that the Chinese government will go after their families who
still live in the country.' 39 There is strong evidence that family members
are persecuted when the target is in hiding. 40 Only during their asylum
hearings will the asylee feel comfortable explaining the truth of the matter
to bring about their exodus from China. This new law will allow the judge
to find that the applicant is not credible based on these inconsistencies,
even if there is corroborative evidence or a good explanation for the
inconsistencies that may only be discovered in a hearing.
Another major change in the asylum law is that the Act requires that
the applicant prove that his or her "race, religion, nationality, social group,
or political opinion was or will be the central motive for his or her
persecution."' 141 Prior to the Act there was inconsistent precedent regarding
whether one of the enumerated elements could be one of many motives or
had to be the central motive. 42 The Act chose to codify the harder standard
of proof. This change may have an impact on CPC claims. However, it is
hard to predict whether it will have a disparate effect on CPC claims,
considering the refugee definition specifically mentions resistance to CPC
as persecution based on political opinion.
B. A PROSPECTIVE LOOK AT GRANTS OF ASYLUM BASED ON RESISTANCE
TO COERCIVE POPULATION CONTROL IN LIGHT OF THE REAL ID ACT
By removing the numerical limits on the number of asylum-seekers
who can be granted asylum based on resistance to CPC and on the number
of asylees who can adjust to LPR, the REAL ID Act will clear out the huge
137. GARCIA, supra note 126, at 7.
138. Id.
139. 1998 Hearing, supra note 3, at 25-26 (testimony of Zhou Shiu Yon).
140. Id.
141. WASEM, supra note 11, at 23.
142. GARCIA, supra note 126, at 6.
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backlog in the asylum system. Yet it may also have some unintended
consequences. Allowing unlimited grants of asylum based on resistance to
CPC may encourage even more Chinese citizens to flee China and apply
for asylum in the U.S. It is possible that many of these claims will be
frivolous or impossible to prove, especially when considering the other
provisions of the REAL ID Act. After the IIRIRA amended the refugee
definition, the number of asylum applications from China increased
drastically, making China the number one source country for all asylum
applications, but when the 1,000 grant limit began to cause a backlog, the
number of new cases began to decrease. 143
It is possible that the removal of the cap will cause another increase in
the number of asylum cases from China; however, the other provisions set
forth in section 101 of the REAL ID Act will make it harder for any new
applicants to prove their claims. These provisions increase the burden on
the asylum applicant. Thus, even if there is an initial increase in the
number of applications, it is unlikely that there will be a significant
increase in the number of grants of asylum based on resistance to coercive
population control policies.
V. CONCLUSION
Asylum claims based on resistance to China's OCP have presented a
unique challenge to the U.S. immigration system. On the one hand, the
U.S. is dedicated to protecting those who might be persecuted on the basis
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group. On the other hand, China has a large population
and the OCP applies to all of China's citizens. Resistance to such a harsh
policy is understandable and widespread, but the U.S. cannot offer relief to
China's entire population. The 1,000 grant limit was a compromise that
allowed the U.S. to help some of these applicants while it continued to
assess the problem presented by China's coercive population control
policies. After many years of exceeding the numerical limit it became clear
that the problem was worse than imagined.
The REAL ID Act's removal of these numerical limits was a step in the
right direction in dealing with asylum based on coercive population control.
It allows those capable of demonstrating their need for asylum in the U.S.
to receive it immediately. However, in light of the impact that other
provisions in section 101 will have on asylum applications, the REAL ID
Act is also a compromise. New applicants will have a harder time proving
persecution based on coercive population control policies. Thus, while the
fight is harder, the REAL ID Act offers a greater prize: the right to live in
the U.S., permanently and without fear.
143. See generally WASEM, supra note 11.
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